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Paul Samuelsons critique and equilibrium
concepts in evolutionary game theory
Reinoud Joosteny
December 17, 2009
Abstract
We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly
evolutionarily stable state (TESS ) and the generalized evolutionarily
stable equilibrium (GESE ). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-
ily stable equilibrium (ESE ) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts all
nearby trajectories monotonically, i.e., the Euclidean distance decreas-
ing steadily in time. For a GESE this property should holds for at least
one metric. The TESS generalizes the evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS ) of Maynard Smith & Price [1973]. A TESS attracts nearby tra-
jectories too, but the behavior of the dynamics nearby must be similar
to the behavior of the replicator dynamics near an ESS.
Both notions are dened on the dynamics and immediately imply
asymptotical stability for the dynamics at hand, i.e., the equilibrium
attracts all trajectories su¢ ciently nearby. We consider this the rel-
evant and conceptually right approach in dening evolutionary equi-
libria, rather than dening a static equilibrium notion and search for
appropriate dynamics guaranteeing its dynamic stability. Moreover,
the GESE and the TESS take similar positions as the ESE and ESE
do in relation to other equilibrium and xed point concepts in general.
Key words: evolutionary stability, evolutionary game theory.
JEL-Codes: A12; C62; C72; C73; D83
Just a few days before the completion of this paper, Paul Samuelson, one of the early-
day greats in economics and winner of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel, passed away. In Samuelson [1941] he proved an advocate
of dening stability of an economic equilibrium in terms of the dynamics of a system
of price adjustment, instead of the prevailing practice to dene stability properties of
economic equilibria on the underlying economic system à la Hicks [1939]. See also Negishi
[1962] for a similar evaluation and interpretation of Samuelsons critique. The concepts
to be presented in our contribution, do withstand the general point made by Samuelsons
critique and we have argued before (Joosten [1996, 2006]) and will argue again, that the
ESS concept of Maynard Smith & Price [1973] fails to do so.
yFELab and School of Management & Governance, University of Twente, POB 217,
7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands. Email: r.a.m.g.joosten@utwente.nl
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory originated in mathematical biology where it has
found applications in the modeling of transformations of populations with
several interacting subgroups. It is therefore, not surprising that several
of the elds central concepts have a strong biological avor, even though
evolutionary game theory has become quite independent from its biological
roots. The top two among concepts with such a avor are probably the
evolutionarily stable strategy and the replicator dynamics.
Central in the tradition initiated by Darwin [1859], is the idea of nat-
ural selection, i.e., tter subgroups increase their population shares at the
expense of less t ones. A subgroups tness depends on its genetically
predetermined features, on those of the other subgroups, and on the com-
position of the population.
Maynard Smith & Price [1973] combined game theory with Darwinian
reasoning to explain animal behavior, and introduced the evolutionarily sta-
ble strategy (ESS ). Each ESS is a Nash equilibrium of the game at hand,
and is stable in the following sense. If a population, being at an ESS, is
invaded by a small group using a strategy di¤erent from the one used by the
resident population, then the tness of this invading group is strictly lower
in the strategic environment which arises by their invasion, than the tness
of the original population. The latter property is commonly referred to as
(the) uninvadability (condition).
Taylor & Jonker [1978] introduced the replicator dynamics into the model
of Maynard Smith and Price. They proved that each Nash equilibrium is
a xed point, and almost every ESS is an asymptotically stable xed point
of these dynamics. So, the conceptualization of the ESS predates the rst
actual proof of dynamic stability under evolutionary (Darwinian) dynamics
and the latter kind of stability is to be regarded as the relevant one in a
truly evolutionary context.
The good news of an attractive equilibrium concept and associated dy-
namics for which it is an attractor, i.e., an asymptotically stable xed point,
spread rapidly to areas outside biology. Dynamics, called evolutionary nowa-
days, have been used in the social sciences to model a variety of topics related
to changing entities1, e.g., to model learning or selection processes, market
share or migration dynamics, cf., e.g., Cross [1983], Friedman & Rosenthal
[1986], Hansen & Samuelson [1988], Friedman [1991], Silverberg et al. [1988].
Originally, replicator dynamics were used in a metaphorical (as if) man-
1We refer to Witt [2008a] for a critical review on methods in evolutionary modeling in
the social sciences in general, and Witt & Cordes [2007] for a more specic one. Evolution-
ary game theory has been quite passive in the more conceptual discussions in evolutionary
economics, e.g., as between champions of Universal Darwinism (e.g., Hodgson & Knudsen
[2006]) and opponents (e.g., Cordes [2006], Buenstorf [2006], Vromen [2004, 2006]). Yet,
it can not be accused of shallowly accepting analogies or metaphors, as we will see.
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ner, and formal justications for replicator or other dynamics were lacking.
Since approximately a decade ago, several contributions appeared tackling
the justication theme, cf., e.g., Börgers & Sarin [1997], Schlag [1998,1999],
Fudenberg & Levine [1998], Hofbauer & Sigmund [1998], Sethi [1998], Bren-
ner [1999], Sandholm [2007]. Partial support for the value of these dynam-
ics for modeling may be found in the experimental literature, e.g., Bush
& Mosteller [1955], Roth & Erev [1995], Erev & Roth [1997], Cheung &
Friedman [1997], Camerer & Ho [1999].
From the combined justicationand experimental literatures we may
conclude that evolutionary dynamics may be used for modeling purposes
in the social sciences indeed, but that the replicator dynamics are far from
compelling outside biology. So, we must investigate wider classes of dynam-
ics as plausible candidates for the formal modeling of evolving entities. The
eld has proven to be quite fertile and alternative classes of evolutionary
dynamics have been proposed2, cf., e.g., Friedman [1991], Swinkels [1993],
Ritzberger & Weibull [1995], Samuelson & Zhang [1992], Joosten [1996],
Joosten & Roorda [2009], Harper [2009a,2009b].
Friedman [1991] dened the class of weakly compatible evolutionary dy-
namics which in the terminology of Joosten [1996] imply that the angle
between the relative tness vector and the vector representing the dynamics
is never obtuse. Joosten [1996] introduced sign-compatible dynamics which
imply that the population share of each non-extinct subgroup increases (de-
creases, stays the same) provided its relative tness is positive (negative,
or zero, respectively). Moreover, weakly sign-compatible dynamics were de-
ned as dynamics such that the population share of at least one non-extinct
subgroup having above-average tness increases. Sign-compatible dynam-
ics are both weakly compatible and weakly sign-compatible. A prominent
example of sign-compatible dynamics is the replicator dynamics. The best-
response dynamics of Matsui [1992], a deterministic version of the dynamics
of Gilboa & Matsui [1991], are both weakly compatible and weakly sign-
compatible, but not sign-compatible. Weak sign-compatibility need not im-
ply weak compatibility, nor vice versa.
The theme of expanding the class of plausible evolutionary dynamics
was taken up enthusiastically, as we have seen. Yet, the vast majority of
work in evolutionary game theory remains faithful to its central equilibrium
concept, the ESS. This is rather astonishing since the notion is dened
essentially as a static concept, its dynamic stability only guaranteed for
a small subclass in the rich classes of evolutionary dynamics just mentioned
(see e.g., Hofbauer [2000], Lahkar & Sandholm [2008], Joosten & Roorda
2We focus on deterministic dynamics (on a population level) and relevant equilibrium
concepts. Readers interested in work using stochastic evolutionary dynamics requiring new
types of equilibrium concepts dealing with this stochasticity, are refered to e.g., Gilboa &
Matsui [1991], Fudenberg & Harris [1992], Kandori et al. [1993], Young [1993], Binmore
& Samuelson [1994], Vega-Redondo [1996].
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[2008] for examples). Furthermore, the ESS lacks, as do the replicator
dynamics, a motivation outside the biological realm where it is quite unclear
how to interpret the uninvadability condition.3 Progress seems connected to
nding new dynamics for which the ESS is an asymptotically stable xed
point, rather than coming up with viable alternatives to the ESS.
Friedman [1991] took an elegant but quite rigorous approach by dening
all asymptotically stable xed points of evolutionary dynamics as evolution-
ary equilibria (EE ). No restrictions were posed on the dynamics or on the
type of asymptotic stability, i.e., the behavior of the dynamics nearby. The
ESS is not necessarily an EE, except for the replicator dynamics and a class
of related dynamics; not even for the replicator dynamics every EE is an
ESS (cf., e.g., Taylor & Jonker [1978], Weissing [1991]).
Joosten [1996] presented an evolutionary equilibrium concept directly
based on dynamics, namely the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE ).
The ESE was inspired by the ESS and by early work in economics by Ar-
row & Hurwicz [1958,1960a,b] and Arrow, Block & Hurwicz [1959]. On the
one hand, the conditions dening ESS and ESE are very similar in math-
ematical form. Furthermore, an implication of ESS in biology happens to
be mathematically equivalent to an implication ofWARP, the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference (Samuelson [1938]), in economics. Under WARP all
trajectories under the price-adjustment process of Samuelson [1941] converge
to the equilibrium and the Euclidean distance to it decreases monotonically
over time along any such trajectory su¢ ciently close by. On the other,
Samuelsons dynamics used by Arrow and coauthors do not yield dynam-
ics applicable in an evolutionary framework. The ESE takes, so to speak,
the consequence of WARP in the specic framework mentioned, namely
monotone convergence in the Euclidean distance for given dynamics, as its
raison dêtre. Despite their technical and conceptional similarities, ESS and
ESE coincide only for the a small class of evolutionary dynamics (see e.g.,
Joosten & Roorda [2008]).
Harper [2009a, 2009b] introduces an approach with respect to evolution-
ary dynamics and evolutionary equilibria inspired by information-geometric
concepts, and concepts from statistical thermodynamics. In an original,
unied approach he presents dynamics and equilibria in perfectpairs. For
instance, the so-called escort ESS is a suitable (static) evolutionary equilib-
rium concept for which the so-called escort replicator dynamics are precisely
the dynamics for which it is an asymptotically stable xed point. A par-
ticularly interesting (sub)class of escort dynamics is the class of q-deformed
replicator dynamics. It turns out that two values of the scalar q yield well-
known dynamics in evolutionary game theory; for q = 0 the deformed repli-
cator dynamics are equal to the so-called orthogonal projection dynamics of
3A rather successful interpretation is given e.g., by Witt [2008b, p.16 and onwards] in
the context of social-cognitive (i.e., observational) learning.
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Lahkar & Sandholm [2008], whereas for q = 1 the deformed variant is ac-
tually equal to the standard version of the replicator dynamics. It remains
unclear what the dynamic stability properties of, for instance, an escort ESS
are if the perfect pair is broken up, i.e., alternative dynamics are taken.
Here, we present two novel evolutionary equilibrium concepts, namely
the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE ) and the truly evo-
lutionarily stable state (TESS ). The motivation of the new concepts is
twofold. First, the notions are dened in terms of the behavior of the dynam-
ics near the equilibrium. Most importantly, for these concepts asymptotic
stability is guaranteed, but both put additional restrictions on the dynamics
nearby. Second, the GESE and the TESS take very similar positions to the
ESE and ESS with respect to other equilibrium or xed point concepts for
evolutionary dynamics.
The GESE -concept captures the main idea of monotone convergence
to equilibrium as incorporated by the ESE, that for given dynamics all
trajectories su¢ ciently nearby converge to the equilibrium approaching it
monotonically for at least one distance function or metric. So, the distance
to the equilibrium decreases monotonically over time measured by some
(given) metric. Hence, every ESE is a GESE but not vice versa, and every
GESE is an EE. For a huge number of formal results in geometry one can
be quite imprecise as to which distance function one takes, for monotone
convergence the metric is crucial. An equilibrium may attract all trajectories
nearby monotonically in one metric, but not for another. By sticking to a
denition based on one specic metric, as we did earlier in our denition of
the ESE being a monotone attractor with respect to the Euclidean distance,
one might be accused of introducing an undesirable arbitrariness. To deal
with the latter aspect, we extend the scope of monotonicity to all metrics,
not just the Euclidean or any other specic metric, in the sense described.
The TESS -notion is based on a renement of asymptotic dynamic sta-
bility, too. Every TESS is asymptotically stable for the dynamics at hand,
hence an EE, but not every asymptotically stable xed point of a given
dynamical system is a TESS : If applied to the standardmodel in evolu-
tionary game theory with replicator dynamics, our denition is equivalent to
the ESS.4 In the more general setting of Joosten [1996], our new denition
of the TESS is equivalent to a GESS for the replicator dynamics, for other
ones TESS and GESS need not coincide.
We demonstrate that the two novel concepts take similar yet distinct
places in relation to other equilibrium and xed point concepts, and quite
similar to the one taken by the ESS in a standard evolutionary model us-
ing the replicator dynamics We do not engage in any motivational attempts
4Our major source of inspiration for the TESS was Weissing [1991], who deals with
discrepancies between the ESS and the EE in the context of so-called generalized Rock-
Scissor-Paper games, but whose approach seems unfeasible for more general traditional
evolutionary games, let alone the generalizations introduced in Joosten [1996].
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beyond a dynamic one and a positioning one with regards to other equilib-
rium notions. Clearly, the dynamics are the only aspect in common among
the evolutionary approaches in the social sciences, which suggests that it
is a naturaloverarching motivation. Moreover, any alternative motivation
geared to an application in one type of evolutionary modeling, is bound to
be ill-tted in another.
In the next section, we dene several notions to be used, in Section 3
we present the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium and show con-
nections to equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory. In Section 4
we introduce the truly evolutionarily stable state and show how relations to
other equilibrium concepts. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found
in the Appendix. We stick to the usual language of mathematical biology
throughout the paper for lack of an alternative.
2 Evolutionary dynamics and equilibria
Let x 2 Sn denote a vector of population shares for a population with
n+ 1 distinguishable, interacting subgroups. Here, Sn is the n-dimensional
unit simplex, i.e., the set of all non-negative n+1-dimensional vectors with
components adding up to unity. The interaction of the subgroups has conse-
quences on their respective abilities to reproduce, and tnessmay be seen
as a measure of this ability to reproduce. As behavior of each subgroup is
assumed essentially predetermined, tness depends only on the state of the
system, i.e., the composition of the population.
Let F : Sn ! Rn+1 be a tness function, i.e., a continuous function
attributing to every subgroup its tness at each state x 2 Sn. Then, the
relative tness function f : Sn ! Rn+1 is given by:
fi(x) = Fi(x) 
Pn+1
j=1 xjFj(x); for all i 2 In+1; and x 2 Sn:
So, a relative tness function attributes to each subgroup the di¤erence
between its tness and the population share weighted average tness taken
over all subgroups.
In the sequel, we assume that there exists a given function h : Sn ! Rn+1
satisfying
Pn+1
j=1 hj(x) = 0 for all x 2 Sn. Consider this system of n + 1
autonomous di¤erential equations:

x = dxdt = h(x) for all x 2 Sn; (1)
where dxdt denotes the continuous-time changes of the vector x 2 Sn. A
trajectory under the dynamics h is a solution, fx(t)gt0; to x(0) = x0 2
Sn and Equation (1) for all t  0. We refrain from placing too many
mathematical restrictions on h at this point, we do require existence and
uniqueness of trajectories. Continuity of h implies existence, and Lipschitz
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continuity or di¤erentiability implies uniqueness. However, some interesting
evolutionary dynamics are neither di¤erentiable, nor continuous. We refer to
Perko [1991] as an excellent textbook on di¤erential equations and dynamics.
The evolution of the composition of the population is represented by
system (1). To make sense in an evolutionary framework further restrictions
on the system are required. The function h is therefore assumed to be
connected to the relative tness function f in one of the many ways proposed
in the literature, cf., e.g., Nachbar [1990], Friedman [1991], Swinkels [1993],
Joosten [1996], Ritzberger &Weibull [1995]. For so-called sign-compatible
Darwinian dynamics, the change in population share of each subgroup with
positive population share corresponds in sign with its relative tness; for
weakly sign-compatible Darwinian dynamics, at least one subgroup with
positive relative tness grows in population share.5 An alternative class is
dened by Friedman [1991], Darwinian dynamics are weakly compatible
if f (x)  h (x)  0 for all x 2 Sn: Sign-compatible dynamics are weakly
compatible, not vice versa.
dynamics      dynamics
Sign- comp.
dynamics
Weakly sign-compatible   Weakly compatible
REP
BN
BR
Figure 1: A Venn-diagram representing connections between di¤erent classes
of evolutionary dynamics. REP denotes the replicator dynamics, BR the
best-response dynamics and BN the dynamics of Brown & Von Neumann.
The state y 2 Sn is a saturated equilibrium if f(y)  0n+1; a xed
point if h(y) = 0n+1; a xed point y is (asymptotically) stable if, for
any neighborhood U  Sn of y, there exists an open neighborhood V  U
of y such that any trajectory starting in V remains in U (and converges to
y): A saturated equilibrium y 2 Sn is called strict if fj(y) = 0 for precisely
one j 2 In+1 in an open neighborhood U  Sn of y: It should be noted that
strictness of a saturated equilibrium immediately implies that it is a vertex
5These classes are due to Joosten [1996]. There are more than a few connections
between sign-compatible dynamics and excess payo¤ dynamics of Sandholm [2005].
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of the unit simplex. The saturated equilibrium was introduced by Hofbauer
& Sigmund [1988], the strict version is due to Joosten [1996].
At a saturated equilibrium all subgroups with below average tness have
population share equal to zero. So, rather than survival of the ttest, we
have extinction of the less t. If the tness function is given by F (x) = Ax
for some square matrix A, every (strict) saturated equilibrium coincides with
a (strict) Nash equilibrium of the evolutionary bi-matrix game
 
A;A>

.
Example 1 The replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker [1978]), given by
hi (x) = xifi(x) for all i 2 In+1; x 2 Sn;
are sign-compatible. It can be easily conrmed that f(y)  0n+1 and y 
f(y) = 0n+1; imply yi > 0 and fi(y) = 0; or yi = 0 and fi(y)  0; therefore
h(y) = 0n+1: This means that every saturated equilibrium is a xed point of
the replicator dynamics. However, note that for ei, i.e., the i-th vertex of
the unit simplex Sn; h (ei) = 0n+1 as well.
The xed point y 2 Sn is a generalized evolutionarily stable state
(GESS, Joosten [1996]) if and only if there exists an open neighborhood
U  Sn of y satisfying
(y   x)  f(x) > 0 for all x 2 Unfyg: (2)
A geometric interpretation of (2) is that the angle between the vector point-
ing from x towards the equilibrium, i.e., (y   x) ; and the relative tness
vector f(x) is always acute. The GESS generalizes the ESS, the evolution-
arily stable strategy, of Maynard Smith & Price [1973] in order to deal with
arbitrary (relative) tness functions.
Taylor & Jonker [1978] introduced the replicator dynamics into mathe-
matical biology and gave conditions guaranteeing that each ESS is an as-
ymptotically stable xed point of these dynamics. Zeeman [1981] extended
this result and pointed out that the conditions formulated by Taylor &
Jonker [1978] are almost always satised. The most general result on as-
ymptotic stability regarding the replicator dynamics for the ESS is Hofbauer
et al. [1979] as it stipulates an equivalence of the ESS and existence of a
Lyapunov function of which the time derivative is equal to Eq. (2).
Friedman [1991] took an elegant way of coping with evolutionary stability
as he dened any asymptotically stable xed point of given evolutionary
dynamics as an evolutionary equilibrium (EE ). Most approaches however,
deal with conditions on the underlying system in order to come up with
a viable evolutionary equilibrium concept, or deal with renements of the
asymptotically stable xed point concept (e.g., Weissing [1991]).
In Joosten [1996,2006] we argued against dening an evolutionary equi-
librium concept in a static manner. We also noted that early economics took
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a similar path of development of concepts. Hicksian stability of an equilib-
rium (cf., Hicks [1939]) can be seen as a conceptual relative to the ESS
in biology. In economics, Samuelson [1941] became the great advocate of
studying dynamics directly instead of the underlying system driving them.
However, the indirect approach, i.e., deriving conditions on the underly-
ing system guaranteeing stability of equilibrium for some class of dynamics,
was never completely abandoned. See Uzawa [1961] and Negishi [1962] for
relevant overviews.
Joosten [1996] dened an evolutionary equilibrium concept on the dy-
namic system, wishing to rule out some asymptotically stable xed points.
Namely, the ones which induce trajectories starting nearby, but going far
away from the equilibrium before converging to it in the end. The xed
point y 2 Sn is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium if and only if there
exists an open neighborhood U  Sn of y satisfying
(y   x)  h(x) > 0 for all x 2 Unfyg: (3)
A geometric interpretation of (3) is that su¢ ciently close to the equilibrium
the angle between (y   x) and the vector representing the direction of the
dynamics is always acute. Note the striking similarity between Equations
(2) and (3), where the relative tness function and the function representing
the dynamics take equivalent positions in the expressions. Yet, (2) does not
imply (3), nor vice versa. Equivalence of (2) and (3) is guaranteed for the
orthogonal projection dynamics of Lahkar & Sandholm [2008] as commented
upon in Joosten & Roorda [2008]. Hofbauer & Sandholm [2009] proved that
ESS is su¢ cient for monotone convergence in the Euclidean distance from all
interior states for all so-called stable games under the orthogonal projection
dynamics.
The evolutionarily stable equilibrium concept was inspired by the Euclid-
ean distance approach of early contributions in economics, e.g., Arrow &
Hurwicz [1958,1960a,b] and Arrow, Block & Hurwicz [1959], since under
WARP and Samuelsons simultaneous tâtonnement process (i.e., Eq. (3)
with h(x) = f(x)) implies that the squared Euclidean distance is a (strict)
Lyapunov function for U . Let namely,
V (x) = (y   x)  (y   x) ;
then clearly V (y) = 0; moreover, V (x) > 0, and

V (x) =  2 (y   x)h(x) < 0
whenever x 2 Unfyg: Note that h does not induce dynamics on the unit
simplex, but on a ball with the origin as its center.
3 Generalized evolutionarily stable equilibria
Each evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE ) is an asymptotically stable
xed point of the dynamics at hand as the Euclidean distance to the equi-
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librium decreases monotonically along every trajectory su¢ ciently near the
equilibrium. We now turn to generalizing this concept, where the general-
ization also depends directly on the dynamics.
Denition 2 Given relative tness function f : Sn ! Rn+1 and evolution-
ary dynamics h : Sn ! Rn+1; let d : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R be a distance function,
 : R+[f0g ! R be di¤erentiable, and monotonically strictly either decreas-
ing or increasing, with  (0) = 0: Let furthermore, V : Rn+1  Rn+1 ! R
be given by
V (x; y) =  (d(x; y)) for all x; y 2 Rn+1:
Then, y 2 Sn is a generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium if and
only if an open neighborhood U  Sn containing y; exists such that for
all x 2 Unfyg it holds that [V (x; y)  0] 

V (x; y) < 0; where

V (x; y) =Pn+1
i=1
@V
@xi
hi (x) :
In words, the function V above is a monotone transformation of a distance
function. Under the dynamics the function increases (decreases) in time
close to a local maximum (minimum).
We show now that each generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium
(GESE ) is an asymptotically stable xed point of the dynamics attracting
all trajectories nearby monotonically for at least one metric.
Theorem 3 Each generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium is an asymp-
totically stable xed point for the dynamics at hand, and along any trajectory
su¢ ciently nearby the distance to the equilibrium decreases monotonically in
time for at least one metric.
The name generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium is motivated by the
circumstance that replacing the function V above by the squared Euclidean
distance, yields the denition of an ESE. Namely, take (x) = x2 for all
x 2 R and d(x; y) = d2(x; y) where d2(x; y) is the Euclidean distance, then
it follows that an ESE is a special case of a GESE.
Corollary 4 Each evolutionarily stable equilibrium is a generalized evolu-
tionarily stable equilibrium.
Essentially, Denition 2 implies that along any trajectory of the dynam-
ics su¢ ciently near the GESE converges to it with at least one distance
(not necessarily the Euclidean) decreasing monotonically in time. So, for
this distance function at least, the convergence towards the equilibrium is
very well-behaved and it is excluded that any trajectory su¢ ciently close by
moves away from it before nally converging to it.
10
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a
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   c
d
a
b
d
 c
Figure 2: Monotonic convergence in one metric need not imply the same in
another. Here, a; b; c and d denote level curves with respect to the equilib-
rium y of four di¤erent types of distance functions. Left: for dynamics 1
all distances decrease; dynamics 2 approach y in type c but not in type d
metric; for 3 the distance decreases for type a but not for type b. Right:
dynamics 4 move closer to y for b, not for c, 5 move closer to y for b, not for
d. Four types induce 24 similar discrepancies.
By now, the reader may have understood that unlike for many results
in topology and geometry where distance functions are essentially equiva-
lent, for monotonic convergence as meant above, distance functions are not.
Figure 2 may serve to illustrate this point.
Although Denition 2 implies the existence of a Lyapunov function as
shown in the proof of the result following it, it is not true that asymptotic
Lyapunov stability implies evolutionary stability in the sense described.
Even if only evolutionary dynamics are considered (as the denition de-
mands) not every Lyapunov stable xed point of the dynamics is a general-
ized evolutionarily stable equilibrium. For instance, the level curves of the
Lyapunov functions implied by Denition 2 can not take any form as the
triangular inequality must hold. The latter implies that the sets of points
enclosed by those level curves are convex. So, Lyapunov stabilityis a less
stringent requirement than evolutionary stability as formulated in Denition
2, but a more stringent requirement than asymptotic stability.
3.1 Relations to other equilibrium concepts
Recently, Hofbauer & Sandholm [2009] introduced an interesting class of
games, called strictly stable games. A game is strictly stable i¤
(y   x)  (F (y)  F (x)) < 0 for all x; y 2 Sn; x 6= y
11
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which straightforwardly translates into our notations as
(y   x)  (f (y)  f (x)) < 0 for all x; y 2 Sn; x 6= y:
If an equilibrium y 2 Sn is located in the interior of the unit simplex, it
follows furthermore that
(y   x)  f(x) > 0 for all x 2 Snnfyg:
Since every interior equilibrium of a stable game satises (2) for the entire
state space, the following is immediate.
Corollary 5 Every interior equilibrium of a strictly stable game is a GESS.
It is well established that every ESS is an asymptotically stable xed point
of the replicator dynamics (cf., e.g., Taylor & Jonker [1978], Zeeman [1981],
Hofbauer et al. [1979]). An analogous result was proven in Joosten [1996]
with respect to the generalized evolutionarily stable state. However, an
interior equilibrium of a strictly stable game, can be shown an asymptotically
stable xed point of many types of evolutionary dynamics6, cf., Joosten
[2006], Joosten & Roorda [2008], Hofbauer [2000], Hopkins [1999].
To show connections between the GESS and GESE, we need to introduce
two rather new evolutionary dynamics.
Denition 6 (Joosten & Roorda [2008]) The ray-projection dynamics
are for the interior of the unit simplex given by
hri (x) = fi(x)  xi
X
k2In+1
fk (x) : (4)
Denition 7 (Lahkar & Sandholm [2008]) The orthogonal-projection
dynamics for the interior of the unit simplex are given by
hoi (x) = fi(x) 
1
n+ 1
X
k2In+1
fk (x) : (5)
These dynamics can be regarded as projections of the vector f(x) at x 2 Sn
unto the unit simplex. As the names suggest, in one variant a projection
along a ray is chosen and in the other an orthogonal projection (see Joosten
& Roorda [2008] for more detailed descriptions).
Now, we are ready to present the following results connecting (G)ESS
stability to real, i.e., dynamic, evolutionary stability.
6The property dening a (strictly) stable game is called (strong) monotonicity in eco-
nomics (see Joosten [2006]). Many results link monotonicity to stability, e.g., Nikaidô
[1959] who was in turn inspired by Brown & Von Neumann [1950].
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Proposition 8 Let y 2 int Sn: For the orthogonal-projection dynamics
 y is a GESS implies y is a GESE,
 y is an ESE implies that y is a GESS.
Joosten & Roorda [2008] prove that every interior evolutionarily stable state
is an asymptotically stable xed point of the ray-projection dynamics. We
now prove a slightly more precise statement.
Proposition 9 Every interior GESS is a GESE for the ray-projection dy-
namics.
The converse statement of the proposition does not hold. However, every
interior ESE for the ray-projection dynamics is a GESS (cf., Joosten &
Roorda [2008]).
Joosten & Roorda [2008] formulated two generalized projections of the
price-adjustment dynamics of Nikaidô & Uzawa [1960]. The latter dynamics
are dened component-wise and for strictly positive  by
gi (x) = maxf0; fi(x) + xig   xi for all i 2 In+1: (6)
Here, x 2 Sn is a vector of relative prices normalized to add up to unity, and
f(x) is a generalized excess demand function, i.e., a function characterized
by continuity and Walraslaw, i.e., x  f(x) = 0 for all x 2 Sn: In Joosten
[1996, 2006] many formal correspondences were shown between concepts
in mathematical biology and mathematical economics. To be interesting for
application in an evolutionary framework in game theory, it should hold that
the dynamics are dened on the unit simplex and stay there. It is obvious,
however, that these price-adjustment dynamics do not induce trajectories
on the unit simplex. Using the approach introduced in Joosten & Roorda
[2008], we project the dynamics of Nikaidô & Uzawa [1960] on the unit
simplex and obtain as evolutionary dynamics:
hri (x) = maxf0; fi(x) + xig   xi
n+1X
j=1
maxf0; fj(x) + xjg; (7a)
hoi (x) = maxf0; fi(x) + xig   xi +
1
n+ 1
 
1
n+ 1
n+1X
j=1
maxf0; fj(x) + xjg; (7b)
where x 2 Sn; and superscripts r and o denote ray projection respectively
orthogonal projection. By continuity of the relative tness function f , it
13
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holds for every interior saturated equilibrium that a neighborhood U con-
taining y exists such that fi(x) + xi > 0 for all i 2 In+1, x 2 U: Then, this
implies that for all i 2 In+1, x 2 U :
hri (x) = fi(x) + xi   xi
n+1X
j=1
(fj(x) + xj)
= fi(x) + xi   xi   xi
n+1X
j=1
fj(x) = 
24fi(x)  xi n+1X
j=1
fj(x)
35 :
Similarly, we obtain for all i 2 In+1, x 2 U :
hoi (x) = 
24fi(x)  1
n+ 1
n+1X
j=1
fj(x)
35 :
Since both generalized projection dynamics are a multiple of the correspond-
ing projection dynamics, the results of this section apply. Hence, the validity
of the following is immediate.
Corollary 10 Let y be an interior GESS. Then, y is a GESE for (7a),
moreover y is a GESE for (7b).
We now recall a result from Joosten [1996] where it was shown that every
strict saturated equilibrium (SSAT ) is an asymptotically stable xed point
for all weakly sign-compatible evolutionary dynamics. In the proof of this
result it was shown that
V (x) = 1  xi
is a strict Lyapunov function near the strict saturated equilibrium e(i); where
e (i) 2 Sn is the vertex determined by e (i)i = 1: Observing that this function
can be rewritten as
V (x) = d1 (e (i) ; x) = lim
p!+1
0@n+1X
j=1
je (i)j   xj jp
1A1=p ;
we may immediately draw the following conclusion.
Corollary 11 Every SSAT is a GESE for all weakly sign-compatible evo-
lutionary dynamics.
This result means that such a strict saturated equilibrium is an asymptoti-
cally stable xed point for a very large collection of dynamics plausible for
modeling evolutionary processes. Moreover, the distance measured in the
14
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so-called maximum norm decreases monotonically in time for each trajectory
started su¢ ciently close to the equilibrium.
We now give an overview of the results presented in this section. The
abbreviations ASFP , SFP , FP , SSAT and SAT mean the sets of asymp-
totically stable xed points, stable xed points, xed points, strict saturated
equilibria, and saturated equilibria respectively. Here, we abuse notations
introduced somewhat by using them for the corresponding sets as well.
Summary We have the following relations with respect to the generalized
evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
 For arbitrary evolutionary dynamics GESE  ASFP  SFP  FP:
 For weakly sign-compatible dynamics SSAT  GESE  ASFP 
SFP  FP:
 For sign-compatible dynamics SSAT  GESE  ASFP  SFP 
SAT  FP:
 For orthogonal- and ray-projection dynamics SSAT  GESS  GESE:
 For the generalized orthogonal- and ray-projections of the dynamics
of Nikaidô & Uzawa [1960] GESS  GESE:
4 Truly evolutionarily stable states
The generalization of the ESS to be presented here, is inspired by this
concept, but avoids the traditional mistake of dening a static evolutionary
equilibrium concept.
Denition 12 Let relative tness function f : Sn ! Rn+1 and evolutionary
dynamics h : Sn ! Rn+1 be given. Let furthermore C(z) = fi 2 In+1j
zi > 0g for all z 2 Sn and let Sn(S) = fx 2 Snj xi > 0 for all i 2 S  In+1g:
Then, the state y 2 Sn is a truly evolutionarily stable state i¤
a. h(y) = 0n+1;
b. a nonempty open neighborhood U  Sn(C(y)) containing y exists such
that X
i2C(y)
(yi   xi) hi(x)
xi
 
X
i=2C(y)
hi(x) > 0:
Condition (a) guarantees that the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS )
is indeed a xed point of the evolutionary dynamics. Condition (b) guar-
antees the stability of the equilibrium as we are about to prove. The latter
condition applied to interior xed points is closely related to the so-called
15
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Shahshahani-gradient, introduced by Shahshahani [1979] and employed to
prove asymptotic stability of ESS for the replicator dynamics by e.g., Sig-
mund [1985].
Our major source of inspiration for the TESS was Weissing [1991], who
deals with discrepancies between the ESS and the EE. Weissing analyzes
generalized Rock-Scissor-Paper (RSP) games with the replicator dynamics.
In the standard RSP game all trajectories cycle around a unique interior
xed point of the replicator dynamics. This Nash equilibrium is therefore
neither unstable, nor asymptotically stable, but merely stable. Changing the
structure of the RSP game slightly, as the class of generalized RSP games
allows, turns the Nash equilibrium into an asymptotically stable xed point
of the replicator dynamics, or into a repellor, a point from which all tra-
jectories nearby move away. Weissing stops short of presenting a concept
generalizing the ESS. He demonstrates that some EE, while not being ESSs,
can be turned into an ESS by applying a so-called barycentric transforma-
tion. This approach seems hardly generalizable to our framework as relative
tness functions are characterized by continuity and complementarity, but
it inspired us to introduce the above.
To show asymptotic stability of a TESS, we use a variant of the second
method of Lyapunov introduced by Uzawa [1961]. For this method it su¢ ces
to show that a function bounded from above exists having a time derivative
which is strictly positive in an open neighborhood of a xed point (cf., e.g.,
Perko [1991]).
Theorem 13 Every TESS is an asymptotically stable xed point of the dy-
namics at hand.
4.1 Relations to other equilibrium concepts
The following extends results from Joosten [1996] to the present generaliza-
tion of the ESS concept. The validity of the statement follows from the fact
that every TESS is asymptotically stable, whereas a result in Joosten [1996]
states that all asymptotically stable xed point of weakly sign-compatible
dynamics belong to the set of saturated equilibria.
Corollary 14 Every TESS of weakly sign-compatible dynamics is a satu-
rated equilibrium.
The converse statement does not hold, as unstable interior xed points of
weakly-sign compatible dynamics are saturated equilibria, which would yield
a contradiction with the previous result.
The following minor result is not implied by any previous one known to
us, but its proof is certainly inspired by a similar one in Joosten [1996].
Lemma 15 Every strict saturated equilibrium is a TESS for all weakly sign-
compatible dynamics.
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This means that a strict saturated equilibrium combines a large number
of properties desirable in evolutionary modeling. Not only is every strict
saturated equilibrium a TESS for a large family of evolutionary dynamics,
it is a (G)ESS regardless of the dynamics and it is a GESE for weakly
sign-compatible dynamics.
One may wonder what the relation of the TESS to the GESS is. The
following result sheds some light on this question.
Proposition 16 For the replicator dynamics, y is a TESS if and only if y
is a GESS.
So, we may regard the TESS as a generalization of the GESS concept with
respect to the dynamic stability properties holding for a set of evolutionary
dynamics of which the replicator dynamics are a special example.
Summary We have the following relations with respect to the truly evolu-
tionarily stable state.
 For arbitrary evolutionary dynamics TESS  ASFP  SFP  FP:
 For weakly sign-compatible dynamics SSAT  TESS  ASFP 
SFP  FP:
 For sign-compatible dynamics SSAT  TESS  ASFP  SFP 
SAT  FP:
 For weakly compatible dynamics TESS  ASFP  SFP  SAT 
FP:
 For the replicator dynamics TESS = GESS:
Figure 3 visualizes connections between concepts introduced in this paper.
5 Conclusion
We presented two equilibrium concepts for evolutionary modeling in the
social sciences, the generalized evolutionarily stable equilibrium (GESE )
and the truly evolutionarily stable strategy (TESS ). Each GESE attracts
all trajectories nearby such that the distance to the equilibrium decreases
monotonically over time. An ESE (Joosten [1996]) is a special example in
the class, as the concept implies monotonic convergence it with respect to
the Euclidean distance.
The TESS is a generalization of the generalized evolutionarily stable
state (GESS, Joosten [1996]) which is in itself a generalization of the evolu-
tionarily stable strategy of Maynard Smith & Price [1973]. The GESS allows
17
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ASFP SFP  FP
SAT
GESE
GESS
TESS
SSAT
WSC
WSC
REP
SC
OPD
ESE
ESS
SC
RPD
RUN,OUN
Figure 3: An overview of equilibrium concepts under evolutionary dynamics.
Arrows indicate inclusions; brown arrows are inclusions holding in general;
otherwise the notation implies the inclusion for special (classes of) dynam-
ics. (W )SC denotes (weakly) sign-compatible dynamics; RPD, OPD, REP
denote ray-projection, orthogonal-projection respectively replicator dynam-
ics. RUN (OUN ) are the generalized ray (orthogonal) projections of the
dynamics of Nikaidô & Uzawa [1960].
essentially all continuous tness functions, where the original approach and
denitions of Maynard Smith & Price [1973] only allow bi-linear continuous
ones. So, in many models the GESS and ESS concepts coincide. Moreover,
the GESS concept implies asymptotic stability of the replicator dynamics of
Taylor & Jonker [1978]. TESS implies asymptotic stability of the dynamics
under consideration and in the special case that the replicator dynamics
are examined the TESS and GESS coincide. Hence, in the original model
of Maynard Smith & Price [1973] examined under the assumption that the
population evolves according to the replicator dynamics, the TESS and ESS
coincide.
With this contribution we in fact open a discussion and a critical eval-
uation of equilibrium concepts in evolutionary modeling.7 We dened two
new equilibrium notions being renementsof the well-known asymptotic
stability concept for deterministic dynamics. However, anyone could come
up with alternative ideas for renements, and there is hardly any one way to
decide which concept should be preferred to another. To structure a discus-
7The discussion will be very short if a vast majority of the eld is satised with the
approach taken by Friedman [1991], where all asymptotically stable xed points of evolu-
tionary dynamics are dened as evolutionary equilibria, su¢ ces. Certainly, these equilibria
will withstand Samuelsons critique, but on the one hand, renements might be required
for meaningful evolutionary equilibrium concepts, on the other this critique might not be
the only possible one.
18
 #0916 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
sion on appropriate properties regarding evolutionary equilibrium concepts
the eld may turn to axiomatics, i.e., formulating a set of desirable proper-
ties that a goodconcept should have and then select among the total of
imaginable ones a subset or ideally a singleton fullling them.
Axiomatic approaches are not alien to game theory as these have been
applied to solution concepts in cooperative game theory (see e.g., Peleg &
Sudhölter [2003]). Neither are they alien to the social sciences as demon-
strated for instance in consumer theory in economics, cf., e.g., Varian [1992]
for an excellent textbook on the matter. Somewhat closer to the framework
of this paper is the work of Sandholm were axioms (called desiderata) are
formulated in order to motivate or reject certain evolutionary dynamics (see
e.g., Sandholm [2005,2007]). Future research should aid in devising criteria
to select among equilibrium concepts in evolutionary theorizing in the social
sciences, i.e., beyond the framework of mathematical biology.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3. Let relative tness function f : Sn ! Rn+1 and
evolutionary dynamics h : Sn ! Rn+1 be given. Let y be a GESS. So, the
following items exist.
 A distance function ed : Rn+1  Rn+1 ! R;
 A di¤erentiable function e : R+ [ f0g ! R which is monotonically
strictly either decreasing or increasing, with e (0) = e0;
 A function eV : Rn+1  Rn+1 ! R given by
eV (x; y) = e ed(x; y) for all x; y 2 Rn+1;
 An open neighborhood U  Sn containing y such that for all x 2
Unfyg it holds that
heV (x; y)  e0i  eV (x; y) < 0; where eV (x; y) =Pn+1
i=1
@ eV
@xi
hi (x) :
Dene W : Sn ! R for all x 2 U by
W (x) =
( eV (x; y)  e0 if eV (x; y)  e0  0;
 
eV (x; y)  e0 otherwise.
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Hence, W (y) = 0 and W (x) > 0 for all x 2 Unfyg: Furthermore, for all
x 2 Unfyg :

W (x) =
n+1X
i=1
@W
@xi
hi (x)
=
8><>:
eV (x; y) =Pn+1i=1 @ eV@xihi (x) < 0 if eV (x; y)  e0 > 0;
 
eV (x; y) =  Pn+1i=1 @ eV@xihi (x) > 0 if eV (x; y)  e0 < 0.
This implies that W is a strict Lyapunov function on U and by Lyapunovs
second method this in turn implies that y is an asymptotically stable xed
point of h (cf., e.g., Perko [1991]): Observe that W is a monotone transfor-
mation of ed; positively valued outside y and always decreasing in Unfyg.
Given the monotonicity of the transformation, it follows immediately that
there is a one-to-one relationship between W and ed decreasing monotoni-
cally over time.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let y be an interior GESS, i.e., Eq. (2) holds
for some open neighborhood U containing y. Let x 2 Unfyg; then
(y   x)  f(x) > 0,
(y   x)  f(x) 
0@ 1
n+ 1
X
h2In+1
fh (x)
1A X
i2In+1
(yi   xi) > 0,
X
i2In+1
(yi   xi) 
24fi(x)  1
n+ 1
X
h2In+1
fh (x)
35 > 0:
The rst equivalence holds because
P
i2In+1 (yi   xi) = 0: This means that
there exists a neighborhood U of y containing y such that (3) holds for the
dynamics given by (5). Hence, y is a GESE. To show the other implication,
note that if y is an ESE of the orthogonal-projection dynamics given by (5),
there exists a neighborhood U 0 such that (3) holds, i.e., the nal inequality
in the above. Going backward in the equivalences, we obtain that (2) must
hold for U 0 as well. This means that y is a GESS.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let y 2 int Sn be a GESS, then an open neigh-
borhood U exists such that y 2 U and (y   x)  f(x) > 0 for all x 2 Unfyg:
Let U 0 = fx 2 Rn+1+ nf0gj  1x x 2 U and jjxjj2 = 1g: Dene distance function
d : Sn  Sn ! Rn+1+ [ f0g by
d(x; y)  d2
0@ xqPn+1
i=1 x
2
i
;
yqPn+1
i=1 y
2
i
1A for every x; y 2 Sn: (9)
20
 #0916 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Since U is open and y is in the interior, we can nd a nonempty open ball
B  U 0 \ int Rn+1+ nf0g: Given relative tness function f : Sn ! Rn+1;
dene function f : Rn+1+ nf0g ! Rn+1 by
f(x) = f( 1x x) for x 2 Rn+1+ nf0g:
Let trajectory fx (t)gt0 be determined by
x(0) = x0 2 Bnfyg;
dx
dt
= f(x) for all int x 2 Rn+1+ nf0g:
Since, x  f(x) = x  f( 1x x) = x
 
 1x x
  f( 1x x) = x0 for all x 2
Rn+1+ nf0g;
djjxjj22
dt
=
d(x  x)
dt
= 2x  dx
dt
= 2x  f(x) = 0:
Hence, jjzjj2 = 1 for z 2 fx (t)gt0:
Furthermore, for ey = 1pPn+1
i=1 y
2
i
y and ex 2 U 01, we have
d(d2(ey; ex)2)
dt
=
d(ey   ex)  (ey   ex)
dt
=  2(ey   ex)dx
dt
=  2(ey   ex)  f(ex)
=  2  eyy   ex 1ex ex  f( 1ex ex)
=  2ey  y    1ex ex  f( 1ex ex) + 2  ey   ex   1ex ex  f( 1ex ex)
=  2ey  y    1ex ex  f( 1ex ex) < 0:
So, fx (t)gt0 converges monotonically to ey in d2, hence f 1x(t)x (t)gt0 con-
verges monotonically to y in d: It was established in Joosten & Roorda
[2008] that the dynamics on the unit simplex connected to f 1x(t)x (t)gt0
are precisely the ray-projection dynamics:
hi (x) =
vuutn+1X
i=1
x2i
24fi(x)  xi
0@ X
k2In+1
fk (x)
1A35 :
Proof of Theorem 13. Let y 2 Sn be a TESS. Let
V (x) =
n+1X
i=1
(yi lnxi   xi) for all x 2 U:
Then clearly, V (x)   1 for all x 2 U , and for x 6= y :

V (x) =
dV (x)
dt
=
n+1X
i=1

yi
xi
  1

hi(x)
=
X
i2C(y)
(yi   xi) hi(x)
xi
 
X
i=2C(y)
hi(x) > 0;
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This implies that V is a strict generalized Lyapunov function in the termi-
nology of Uzawa [1961], hence y is an asymptotically stable xed point of
the dynamics (cf., Uzawa [1961]).
Proof of Lemma 15. Let y be a strict saturated equilibrium, then y
is a vertex of the unit simplex. Without loss of generality we may assume
that this vertex is e1 = (1; 0; :::; 0) 2 Sn: For all j = 2; :::; n + 1 we have
fj(e1) < 0; hence there exists a neighborhood U containing e1 such that
f1(x)  0 > max
j=2;:::;n=1
fj(x) for all x 2 U:
Complementarity of f implies that the weak inequality on the left hand side
is an equality only for e1: Hence, h(y) = 0n+1 for weakly sign-compatible
dynamics and Condition (a) is fullled. Furthermore,
h1(x)  0 for all x 2 U;
with strict inequality if x 6= e1: Observe that for x 2 Unfyg :X
i2C(y)
(yi   xi) hi(x)
xi
 
X
i=2C(y)
hi(x) = (1  x1) h1(x)
x1
 
X
i6=1
hi(x) =
h1(x)
x1
 
n+1X
i=1
hi(x) =
h1(x)
x1
> 0:
Hence Condition (b) is fullled.
Proof of Proposition 16. Let hi (x) = xifi(x) for all i 2 In+1 and all
x 2 Sn: Observe that
(y   x)  f(x) =
n+1X
i=1
(yi   xi) fi (x)
=
X
i2C(y)
(yi   xi) xifi (x)
xi
+
X
i=2C(y)
(yi   xi) fi (x)
=
X
i2C(y)
(yi   xi) hi(x)
xi
 
X
i=2C(y)
xifi (x)
=
X
i2C(y)
(yi   xi) hi(x)
xi
 
X
i=2C(y)
hi (x) :
So,
P
i2C(y) (yi   xi) hi(x)xi  
P
i=2C(y) hi(x) > 0 is equivalent to (y x)f(x) >
0: Hence, for these replicator dynamics TESS and GESS concur.
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